Computer Science – Computer Science and Game Theory
Scientific paper
2011-02-28
Computer Science
Computer Science and Game Theory
Extended abstract appears in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2011
Scientific paper
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial-time. We design a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental variant of combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to combinatorial public projects when players have valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first mechanism that achieves a constant factor approximation for a natural NP-hard variant of combinatorial public projects.
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