A Constrained Evolutionary Gaussian Multiple Access Channel Game

Details A Constrained Evolutionary Gaussian Multiple Access Channel Game A Constrained Evolutionary Gaussian Multiple Access Channel Game

2011-03-13

arxiv.org/abs/1103.2493v1

Computer Science

Computer Science and Game Theory

Scientific paper

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionary multiple access channel game with continuous-variable actions and coupled rate constraints. We characterize Nash equilibria of the game and show that the pure Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size, i.e., they are strong equilibria. We use the concepts of price of anarchy and strong price of anarchy to study the performance of the system. The paper also addresses how to select one specifc equilibrium solution using the concepts of normalized equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategies. We examine the long-run behavior of these strategies under several classes of evolutionary game dynamics such as Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, and replicator dynamics.

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