Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

Biology – Quantitative Biology – Populations and Evolution

Scientific paper

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4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typos

Scientific paper

10.1209/0295-5075/77/30004

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from a randomly chosen neighbors are controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor $w$ characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations $\nu$ at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of $w$ and $\nu$ for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.

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