Risk Minimization and Optimal Derivative Design in a Principal Agent Game

Details Risk Minimization and Optimal Derivative Design in a Principal Agent Game Risk Minimization and Optimal Derivative Design in a Principal Agent Game

2007-10-29

arxiv.org/abs/0710.5512v1

Computer Science

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science

28 pages, 4 figures

Scientific paper

We consider the problem of Adverse Selection and optimal derivative design within a Principal-Agent framework. The principal's income is exposed to non-hedgeable risk factors arising, for instance, from weather or climate phenomena. She evaluates her risk using a coherent and law invariant risk measure and tries minimize her exposure by selling derivative securities on her income to individual agents. The agents have mean-variance preferences with heterogeneous risk aversion coefficients. An agent's degree of risk aversion is private information and hidden to the principal who only knows the overall distribution. We show that the principal's risk minimization problem has a solution and illustrate the effects of risk transfer on her income by means of two specific examples. Our model extends earlier work of Barrieu and El Karoui (2005) and Carlier, Ekeland and Touzi (2007).

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